Nonviolent Change Journal

Vol. XIX, No. 3, Spring, 2005

Nonviolent Change Journal helps to network the peace community: providing dialoguing, exchanges of ideas, articles, reviews, reports and announcements of the activities of peace related groups and meetings, reviews of world developments relating to nonviolent change and resource information concerning the development of human relations on the basis of mutual respect.

On 1 February 2005, Nepal's King Gyanendra dismissed the government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba claiming that the government was incompetent in the fight against the 'Maoist' insurgency which began in 1996. The King assumed direct power and declared a state of emergency, suspending constitutional provisions on freedom of the press, speech and expression, peaceful assembly and the right against preventive detention. Three leading human rights organizations - Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists - warned that "Nepal's last state of emergency in 2001-2002 had led to an explosion of serious human rights violations, including increased extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, and a breakdown in the rule of law."

The King has now appointed a 10-man cabinet under his chairmanship with no prime minister. The short-term consequences means probable repression, especially in the Katmandu area, of the press, non-governmental organizations, and political leaders.

The longer-range significance of this most recent state of emergency is that it is the start of the third and final act of a drama which is likely to see the end of the monarchy as an institution, increased suffering among the already poor population and the danger of a 'power vacuum' between India and China.

Nepal, landlocked between India and China, has a terrain which ranges from the flat river plain of the Ganges in the south, through its large central hill region to the Himalayas in the North. Each ecological area has been populated by different peoples, some coming from India and others from Tibet. It was only late in the 18th century that the country took its current shape with the elimination of local chiefs in favor of a monarchy with its seat in Katmandu. The monarchy has tried to impose one Nepalese language and the Hindu religion as a cement on this diversity of ethnic groups, languages, and religions.

The often antagonistic relationship between India and China is a sub-theme of the drama. Nepal is strategically situated between Tibet and the northern border of India. Both powers view Nepal as a buffer zone over which each has jockeyed for influence. India considers Nepal as part of its 'zone of influence'. China is concerned that Nepal not be used as a base for Tibetan independence activities as it had been in the 1960-1972 period with Tibetan insurgency with its headquarters in the Mustang area of Nepal. China wishes to prevent India from being the sole influence in Nepal and is concerned that India might invade Nepal to prevent a change of regime. India, for its part, is concerned that China could take advantage of any upheaval in Nepal to strengthen its hand against India in the whole region.

Thus, one has to see the action in Nepal against a background of major regional politics and not simply as an insurgency in a far away area of interest only to mountain climbers and Buddhists going to the birthplace of the Buddha.

There is a long prologue to the first act of the drama during which a more-or-less constitutional monarchy is put into place and a parliament with political parties created in 1990. Unfortunately neither the Monarchy nor the Parliament has done much to restructure the economic and social life of the country. The poorer Nepalis, although they constitute the bulk of the population, have remained on the margins of public life. Nepal's economic policies have been shaped by the development ideologies and strategic interests of the donor countries. This has led to shortsighted, dependent forms of development based on playing aid donors one against the other. Development has been in the interest of the elite and of a growing urban middle class which has benefited without making sacrifices or building up domestic savings. There has been little land reform or modifications in the land-holding patterns. With an increase in population but without adequate growth in education and jobs, the young are discontented and open to political violence as well as crime.

The first act of the drama starts with bangs in February 1996 when the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) initiated an armed struggle against the Nepalese government with simultaneous attacks in different areas of the country. The leadership of the armed movement is 'Maoist' - having read books of Mao on the importance of rural guerrillas holding the countryside while letting the cities rot and fall. It is not influenced by the current Chinese government. The real nature of the revolt is more 'Naxalite', named after the village of Naxalbari in north Bengal where tea plantation workers revolted in 1967. Such rural revolts against persistent injustices are often linked to utopian ideologies of equality but do not have a coherent alternative program for government. The 'Maoists' are not a single movement with a well-defined chain of command but many separate revolts with local leaders. This makes negotiations or mediation difficult.

The 'Maoist' insurgency spread to most parts of the country feeding on poverty, class and caste discrimination, ethnic divisions and a lack of government development activities. The 'Maoists', however, do not administer the areas - they are only able to prevent the government from administering the areas. Thus, the bulk of the rural population must cope for themselves.

The first act ends with another bang on 1 June 2001 when King Birendra, his wife and seven other members of the royal family are murdered by his son, the Crown Prince, who then kills himself. See Jonathan Gregson Massacre at the Palace: The Doomed Royal Dynasty of Nepal (Miramax Books, 2002).

Act II begins with the brother of the murdered king becoming King Gyanendra. The King decided that he will play an important political role directly, having little taste for parliamentary life. His first major decision is to call for a ceasefire and negotiations with the 'Maoists'. Thus between July and September 2001, there are three series of talks between representatives of the 'Maoists' and the royal government. The 'Maoists' called for an end to the monarchy, the drafting of a new republican constitution, and an interim government in which they would have a major influence.

No common ground was found between the two sides. Thus in November 2001, the 'Maoist' guerrillas began a new offensive, and the King responded by getting more and newer weapons. The rest of the act is taken up with more fighting, more repression, a few inconclusive talks off stage, but with a larger audience starting to look at the play as government officials in the USA and the UK join Indians and Chinese in looking at what is going on. A few non-governmental organizations in Asia, the US, and Europe have become interested in the conflict and seek to play a positive, mediation role, but with little impact as yet. The divide between the government and the 'Maoists' is very wide. Some independent non-governmental groups in Nepal have proposed some peace measures such as the Birat Declaration for Action: Challenges for Peace and Development in Nepal (November 2003).

February 2005 is the start of the third and probably final act. The clouds darken, increased fighting within Nepal is probable. A greater flow of arms to the area is likely - government to government - from the US and the UK to the Royal Nepal government - from arms dealers via non-governmental groups in India to the 'Maoists'. The danger is real that India and China can be 'sucked into' the power vacuum or more likely willingly stepping in.

I had written in September 2002 for the New Delhi-based Tibetan Review an article "Nepal Watch: A priority" indicating that "The situation requires careful study to see if there are ways to help the forces of democratic change." It is still not clear to me what we outside Nepal can do usefully. There seems to be no 'middle ground' between the King and the 'Maoists'. Each wants the other to disappear. The political parties which functioned when there was a parliament are weak and had little base among the people. Non-governmental organizations outside the control of political parties are weak, but there might be ways to strengthen them.

For the moment, I believe that our priority should be to alert a wider group of people to the dangers of the situation, stressing that non-military means of conflict resolution should be found, and that we should be prepared to help quickly when we find proper and useful channels.

Excerpts from a Letter
on the YOX Movement in Aberbaijan
by Razi Nurullayev
razi_nurullayev@yahoo.co.uk
February 16, 2005

I have resigned from Azerbaijan Popular front Party, where I was serving as deputy-chairman on foreign affairs and joined ÇYOXÈ (which means "NO") MOVEMENT - Azerbaijan, which was also initiated by me after having learned the nonviolent actions throughout the world to which I have given full two years of mine, also reading and appreciating your works on this field. Now this movement grows bigger. We need to get an international support, in order to bring to positive and happy end our newly initiated a social democratic movement. Nevertheless, we have started it from nowhere, with no funding, we hope that we can get some support from democracy organizations worldwide.

I have visited Ukraine in December 2004 during the elections and also attended the closing ceremony of PORA on January 2005 and stayed for a week to converse with PORA. Now we are in close contact and hope that it'll give a push to our movement. We have prepared a large e-mail list to distribute across the Europe to raise awareness. There are a lot of negotiations going on to organize trainings for the new members. Government has become very strict and prohibited all kinds of meetings.

Now PORA helps us to design the symbol of the movement and also ICNC from USA has put us in contact with the USA digital company, who is also preparing the symbol. "YOX" itself is going to be the symbol .

As I said earlier ÇYOXÈ means "NO". This is a nonviolent movement in Azerbaijan, that wishes to say ÇYOXÈ to the regime, which is now in power. We think, to say to this government and president and all its institutions ÇYOXÈ until they resign, otherwise hold democratic elections. This autumn we have the parliamentary elections and we prepare for it. This movement will be coordinated by people who will be responsible for particular fields, in case myself, I'll be unofficial leader of the movement and this is just for taking sometimes necessary decisions. There is no leader at all. We think, the word ÇYOXÈ itself should be a logo, but well designed and any letter in it may contain something indicating to nonviolent movement, or that can psychologically affect people to get up or throw away fear etc. It should be very simple without a lot of decorations, so that people should understand it. It also may be designed in the way that we'll develop it gradually as the movement grows bigger, otherwise wins small victories. It may be a bit "forceful", but also may contain other words. The letter "O" in ÇYOXÈ will have a green frond inside, meaning that from the ruins of non-democracy a branch gives forth to a new life. Green is our color.

There are obvious difficulties we face. I think, the people who wage nonviolent struggle should frequently travel and learn the experiences, which adds up the courage and new experiments. We are deprived of this. Also we should be able to hold trainings for our members.

"YOX" MOVEMENT-AZERBAIJAN is a group without a single leadership and is composed of independently thinking people and mainly of youth. "YOX" MOVEMENT - is a movement of everyone and every joined person becomes its leader. All people have a chance to become a leader at the "YOX" movement. But, our struggle says "YOX" to a single leadership, instead, tries to help to free Azerbaijan from an anti-democratic thinking, to see it fully independent and democratic. And the single leader of the country will be elcted by democratic elections.

Our aim is to "YOX" to an undemocratic though and thinking within the framework of democratic methods and law, contribute to the establishment of democracy in Aberbajan, to give full freedom to the nation, and assist with the integration to the west in quick steps in order to maintain our gained victory.

"YOX" Movement - Azerbaijan Campaign will say "YOX" to any anti-democratic steps at the Parliament, Presidential, and Municipal elections. We shall say "YOX" to any anti-democratic attempts and say "H?" (it means "YES" in English) to fairness and justice at the forthcoming October 2005 Parliamentary elections. Our vision for tomorrow: Anti-democratic Regime - " YOX", Repression - "YOX" , Democratic State - "H?", Democracy "H?", Corruption, Bribery - "YOX" , Good Education - "YES", "?ntegration to West and Democratic Institutions " - "H?", New Job Places - "H?", Favourable Business Environment "H?", Respect for La w - "H?", Rich State - "H?", Rich People - "H?", Real Intellectuals - " H? ", Youth - " H? ", Political Emmigrants return home - "H?", Garabag under occupation - "YOX", False Elections - "YOX" , False Parliament - "YOX", Bureaucracy Willfulness - "YOX", Violence - "YOX". Our principles: volunteering, impartiality/objectiveness. nonviolent means, nonpartisanship, discipline.

3/03/05 update: Now Azerbaijan lives a shock. ''YOX" Movement - Azerbaijan is very much concerned and threatened today. It has become very dangerous to live and work in Azerbaijan. Today on 2 March 2005 a well-known journalist Elmar Huseynov, editor-in chief of Monitor journal was killed in front of his apartment. He was shot dead in the heart. He was a man who was writing against the government and criticizing their antidemocratic actions. This is very bad sign. We are shocked. Now we do not know how to act and what to write. Just, please, know this.

Numerous commentators, in Israel and abroad, speak of "a window of opportunity" and a unique chance to restart the peace process. But for that to be true, quite a few steps are needed - in the first place, on the part of the occupier who has the overwhelming power on the ground:

* Complete cessation of the settlement construction and extension, going on throughout the West Bank, and dismantling of all the "unauthorized settlement outposts" which the government promised more than a year ago;

* Achieving an agreement on an immediate, bilateral ceasefire, including an end to all violent acts by the IDF on the one hand and all Palestinian organizations and armed groups on the other;

* Total cessation of the manhunt against the "wanted Palestinians", their assassinations and detentions and the nightly invasions of the Palestinian towns and villages;

* Removal of all the roadblocks which deny free movement to the Palestinians and strangle the Palestinian economy;

* Release of the Palestinian political leaders imprisoned in Israel, such as Marwan Barghouti and Husam Hader, members of the Palestinian Legislature;

* Widespread release of Palestinian prisoners, including those sentenced to long terms and those defined as "having blood on their hands" (most decision-makers on both sides, Israelis as well as Palestinians, are people bearing direct responsibility to killings, including the killing of civilians).

* The return of Israeli forces to the positions held on September 2000, at the outbreak of the present Intifada, and restoration of the status of the "A" areas as sovereign Palestinian territory, to which Israeli armed forces have no access;

* A stop to the construction of "The Separation Wall" and immediate dismantling of the wall sections which penetrate into the West Bank territory and deprive Palestinians of land and livelihood - in accordance with the verdict of the International Court at the Hague.

* Resuming the negotiations between the state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority/Palestinian Liberation Organization, on all issues including and especially the definite agreement between these two parties.

- The withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces and settlers from the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank must be conducted under a detailed agreement between the two sides, rather than as a unilateral Israeli act;

- Occupation in the Gaza Strip must be ended completely, with all parts of its territory evacuated including the area of the Egyptian border ("Philadelphi Route"), giving the inhabitants free access to the outside world by land, sea and air.

- Third parties, such as Egypt and/or an international force, can be involved in the Israeli evacuation of the Gaza Strip and stabilizing the situation during and after the evacuation, with the dispositions and authority of such forces defined in an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

- Houses and public utilities in the evacuated Israeli settlements would not be demolished but handed over intact to the Palestinian side, with their value enumerated by an agreed international agency, to be reckoned in future negotiations;

- It should be explicitly agreed that Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the norhern West Bank would not be a final step, but a prelude to a process aimed at a definite peace agreement between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine to be, resuming implementation of the "Road Map" defined by the international community;

- As stipulated in "The Road Map", the international facilitator and arbiter in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations should be the international "Quartet" in its entirety, rather than the United States alone - which is manifestly unable and unwilling to act impartially;

- The border between Israel and Palestine would be based on the borders of June 5, 1967, with the possiblity of mutual border rectifications being agreed upon;

- United Jerusalem shall be the capital of both states, West Jerusalem the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem the capital of Palestine;

- There shall be a fair and agreed solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

Obviously Ariel Sharon, Prime Minster of Israel, is completely unwilling to accept even a small part of these principles, as it is not at all his aim to end Israeli occupation on most of the West Bank. In the short range, Sharon may pay lip service to "the new chance for peace" but in practice he does all in his power to cause the failure of the newly-elected Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) - as he did in 2003, when Abbas was Prime Minister.

Knowing the above full well, Nobel Prize Laureate Shimon Peres led his Labor Party to enter the Sharon Cabinet, take up portfolios and assume full legal and moral responsibily for its acts. Yossi Beilin, architect of the Oslo and Geneva Accords, saved the Sharon Government from falling and made his Meretz/Yahad Party into one of the main pillars ensuring its continued existence. Also Knesset Members Dahamshe and A-Sana of the United Arab Party followed suit to a certain degree - by abstaining in the Knesset vote.

These parties and leaders, who got the confidence of hundreds of thousands of voters on the basis of opposing the occupation and declaring their adherence to peace, have assumed a grave responsibility. However sincere their motives might be, they risk going down in history as having helped to perpetuate the occupation and bloody conflict. The very least which can be expected of them, in this precarious situation, is not to confine themselves solely to ensuring implementation of the Gaza Disengagement but rather use in every possible way the leverage they now posses over Sharon, to push towards a total end of the occupation.

For further details contact: Adam Keller, Gush Shalom Spokesperson + 972-3-5565804, + 972-50-6709603, or Gush Shalom, pob 3322, Tel-Aviv 61033 www.gush-shalom.org/:

Now it's official: "the First Democracy in the Arab World" or "the Second Democracy in the Middle East" has been born.

The Palestinian elections have impressed the world. Until now, if elections were held in any Arab country at all, there was only one candidate, and he received 99.62% of the vote. Yet here there were seven candidates, there was a lively election campaign and the winning candidate got only 62%.

The truth is, of course, that Palestinian democracy existed already. In 1996, the Palestinians held elections for the presidency and the parliament, monitored by international observers. Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian struggle for liberation, was not the only one standing; another candidate, Samikha Khalil, a respected woman, did garner almost 10% of the vote. But because of Arafat's dominant personality, the insufficient separation between the branches of government and the relentless Israeli defamation campaign against him, many people around the world did not recognize the Palestinian democracy.

Now the situation is different. Nobody can deny the near-miracle that has happened: the clean transition from the Arafat era to the era of his successors, and the fair elections held under strict international supervision. And, most importantly, democracy was not imposed from the outside, at the whim of a foreign president, but grew from below. And not under normal conditions, but under a brutal occupation.

The whole world acknowledges the Palestinian democracy. That, by itself, creates a new political situation.

Much now depends on the personality of Abu-Mazen. He is setting out under the shadow of his great predecessor. Those who succeed a Founding Father always have a problem at the beginning, like the heirs of Bismarck or Ben-Gurion.

Just think of the man who succeeded Gamal Abd-al-Nasser, the founder of modern Egypt and the idol of the entire Arab world. When Nasser died, I asked my friend, Henry Curiel, what kind of person his almost unknown successor was.

Curiel, who founded the first (mainly Jewish) Egyptian Communist party, had a razor-sharp mind. In Paris he had set up a kind of international center of assistance for liberation movements the world over, while maintaining close ties to his homeland. His answer was short and sharp: "Sadat is a simpleton."

He was not alone in this view. Egyptians used to tell a joke about the dark spot on Sadat's brow: "At every meeting of the Free Officers Committee (that was then ruling the country), Nasser would ask his colleagues to express their opinion. One after the other they stood up and spoke. At the end, Sadat too would get up to speak. Nasser would put his finger on his brow and gently push him back into his chair, saying: Oh, sit down, Anwar!"

Yet upon assuming the presidency, Sadat astounded the world. He sent his army across the Suez Canal, achieving the first significant military victory ever over the Israeli army. His visit to Jerusalem was a brilliant act without precedent in history. Never before had a leader visited the capital of the enemy while still in a state of war.

Abu-Mazen has lived all his life in the shadow of Arafat. He was not a military leader, unlike the adored Abu-Jihad, who was murdered by Israel. He was not in command of the security apparatus, unlike Abu-Iyad, who was murdered by Abu-Nidal. Since 1974, he was closely associated with Arafat's historic efforts to achieve a political settlement with Israel, and in charge of the contacts with the Israeli peace forces. I myself met him for the first time in Tunis, in 1983.

I shall not be surprised if Abu Mazen, as the president of the Palestinian State-in-the-Making, exhibits talents and attributes that did not find their proper expression during the Arafat era. He may yet become the Palestinian Sadat.

Of course, Abu-Mazen is very different from Sadat. The Egyptian leader had a dramatic flair (like Menachem Begin), he loved big gestures (like Arafat). Abu-Mazen's style is the very opposite.

And another huge difference: Sadat was in absolute control of a big country. He could afford to ignore different views. Abu-Mazen does not enjoy this luxury.

He brings with him to his job a valuable dowry: his relationship with the President of the United States.

George Bush is a simple fellow. He likes some people and hates others, and this decides the policy of the greatest power on earth. He likes Ariel Sharon and fawns on him. Since he has never been in battle, he admires the combat-rich Israeli general. Sharon personifies for him the American myth - the annihilation of the Indians and the conquest of the territories. Arafat, on the other hand, reminded him of an Indian chief, whose language is unintelligible and whose ploys are satanic.

When Bush saw Abu-Mazen in Aqaba, a respectable person in a business suit, without beard or keffiyeh, he liked him on sight. That's why he congratulated him this week and invited him to the White House. The question is whether Abu-Mazen can translate this attitude quickly into political achievements.

The situation presents Sharon with a difficult dilemma. His natural inclination is to do unto Abu-Mazen what he did so successfully to Arafat: demonize him and cut his ties with America. Already he is muttering darkly about Abu-Mazen's unwillingness to destroy the "terrorist organizations".

But Sharon knows that he must behave with the utmost care, so as not to make Bush angry. As long as Bush thinks that Abu-Mazen is O.K., Sharon must not be seen to undermine him. This, too, gives Abu-Mazen a chance.

His first task is to come to terms with the refusal-organizations. No leader can conduct national policy with armed factions firing in the opposite direction.

Ben-Gurion was in a similar situation before the foundation of Israel, when faced with the Irgun and the Stern Group who acted independently. Once he tried to integrate them into a unified "Hebrew Revolt Movement", at another time he handed their fighters over to the British police. But it is essential to remember: Ben-Gurion started the decisive confrontation - by shelling the Irgun ship Altalena - only after the State of Israel had already come into being. Then the two organizations were incorporated into the new Israeli army.

Anyone who says that Abu-Mazen is ready or able to start a civil war against Hamas does not know what he is talking about. Palestinian public opinion would not stand for it. Most Palestinians believe that without the armed struggle, Sharon would not be talking of withdrawing from Gaza. They are ready for a cease-fire in order to give Abu-Mazen a chance. But they do not want the liquidation of the fighting organizations, because it may be necessary to renew the armed struggle if Abu-Mazen can't convince the Americans and the Israelis to enable the Palestinians to realize their national aims.

In his dealings with Hamas, Abu-Mazen, like Arafat, will prefer a combination of negotiations, political pressure and mobilizing public opinion. He will have to convince the armed factions to accept the national strategy that is adopted by the leadership. In return, he will have to welcome Hamas into the political system, the PLO and the parliament.

The attack at the Karni crossing this week was a demonstration of power by the armed factions. It was a classic guerilla action, much as the recent destruction of an army post on the "Philadelphi Axis". The organizations want to prove that they have not been vanquished, but rather that they have achieved a draw with the Israeli army. If a cease-fire is arranged, it will not be a sign of weakness on their part. In the same way, the Yom Kippur attack preceded the Egyptian-Israeli peace, and the Hizbullah guerilla war preceded the withdrawal from Lebanon.

If Abu-Mazen achieves such a cease-fire, he will be able to address his main task: to win over Israeli and international public opinion and to change the policy of the United States.

Sadat succeeded in both. But Sadat was dealing with Menachem Begin, who was willing to relinquish Egyptian territory in order to continue his struggle against the Palestinians and prevent the creation of a Palestinian state. Sharon, too, opposes the creation of a Palestinian state in all of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with its capital in East Jerusalem. But Abu-Mazen, like Arafat, cannot and will not be satisfied with anything less than what is now a sanctified aim.

That is another huge difference between Sadat and Abu-Mazen: Sadat came to Jerusalem only after he was secretly assured that Begin was ready to give back all of Sinai. Sharon, on the other hand, is promising Abu-Mazen nothing at all.

Perhaps the second intifada has come to an end. Perhaps the cease-fire in the Gaza Strip will develop into a general, mutual cease-fire.

For me, the words "cease fire" have an extra resonance. When I was a soldier in the 1948 war, I twice experienced what it means to wait for a cease-fire. Each time we were totally exhausted after heavy fighting in which many of our comrades had been killed or wounded. We hoped with all our hearts that a cease-fire would really come into effect, but did not allow ourselves to believe in it. In both cases, a few minutes before the appointed hour, along the whole front line a crazy cacophony of firing erupted, everybody shooting and shelling with everything he had. To attain some last-minute advantages, as it appeared afterwards.

And then, suddenly, the shooting stopped. An eerie quiet settled in. We looked at each other and left unspoken what we all felt: We are saved! We have been left alive!

I understand, therefore, the feelings of the fighters on both sides, who are now hoping that the mutual cease-fire will come into effect and hold. After four and a quarter years of fighting, everybody is exhausted.

Naturally, each side will claim victory. The Palestinian organizations will assert that it was only the Qassam rockets and the mortar shells which compelled Israel to agree to a cease-fire. The Israelis will claim that the Israeli army has crushed terrorism and compelled the Palestinians to give up.

The Israeli army has not won, since it did not succeed in putting an end to the attacks, much less in "destroying the terror infrastructure". On the eve of the cease-fire, the Qassam rockets and mortar shells have turned life in the town of Sderot into hell. The inhabitants don't hide that they are nearing the breaking point.

Moreover, the organizations reached a new level by undertaking more complicated attacks, real guerilla actions. The destruction of the army outpost on the "Philadelphi axis" involved blowing up a tunnel beneath it and storming the post on the ground. Similarly, the attack on the Karni checkpoint combined the explosive demolition of a wall with an attack by fighters. These actions were reminiscent of those of the Irgun and Stern Group in the last years of the British mandate.

Our army had no answer to the Qassams and the guerilla actions. Haven't they tried everything? Brutal incursions. Shelling by tanks, killing fighters and bystanders. Demolition of thousands of homes. Targeted assassinations.

Nothing helped. There remained only the method advocated on TV by Israel Katz, a cabinet minister: to bomb and shell the Gaza Strip towns, open the border to Egypt in one direction and drive hundreds of thousands of inhabitants out into the Sinai desert. (That is what Moshe Dayan did to the Suez canal towns during the War of Attrition, in the late 1960s.) It has been reported that Ariel Sharon himself proposed, after the Karni incident, the bombing of towns and villages in the Gaza Strip. But nowadays this is not possible: neither the Israeli public, nor world public opinion would stand for it.

The simple truth is that the generals are bankrupt. But they have no reason to feel ashamed: no other army has won such a contest in the last hundred years. The French in Algeria arrived at the same point, in spite of torturing thousands of men and women. The same happened to the Americans in Vietnam, in spite of burning down dozens of villages and massacring their inhabitants. Even the Nazis did not succeed in putting down the French resistance, however many hostages they executed.

Our generals, like all the generals before them, made the understandable mistake of thinking in terms of war. But this was no conventional war. A war is a confrontation between armies, and it is fought with methods that have evolved throughout the ages. The confrontation between an army of occupation and resistance forces is quite different. The factors governing that are not taught in officers' courses.

True, the Israeli army tried to improvise, with some success. But it could not win. Because victory means breaking the will of the opponent to resist. And that did not happen.

Interestingly enough, this questions is not posed openly, not even by the Palestinians themselves. First of all, because the idea has been accepted throughout the world that the Palestinian resistance is "terrorism", and who would dare to assert that terrorism had won? The more so since the Palestinians - like the Israelis - committed fearful atrocities.

Also, the propaganda war between Israelis and Palestinians is a kind of world championship of victimhood. Each side presents itself as the ultimate victim. Each side publicizes pictures of dead children, weeping mothers, demolished homes.

Because of this, the Palestinian spokespersons do not boast of the fighting of their compatriots. They avoid pointing to the thousands of their fighters who sacrificed their lives, the children who confronted the tanks, the hundreds of commanders who were "liquidated" and for each of whom a substitute was found, for whom in turn a substitute was found, and so forth. About this, books will be written, songs will be sung, tales will be told in future generations.

Another fact: Palestinian society has not been broken. Israeli tanks roam their streets, hundreds of roadblocks prevent movement from village to village, the economy is shattered, most men are unemployed, hundreds of thousands of children suffer from malnutrition. And in spite of this, miraculously, Palestinian society continues functioning somehow, life goes on, fatigue and exhaustion have not forced it to surrender.

Does this mean that the Palestinian side has won? The organizations can claim that Sharon would not have talked about withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and evacuation of the settlements there if the attacks had not taken place. That is certainly true. But Sharon has not yet begun to consider leaving the West Bank. On the contrary, the settlement activity there is reaching new heights and the land grab is in full swing in the shadow of the "separation fence". One cannot call that a Palestinian victory.

All this points to a deadlock. The Israeli army knows that it cannot vanquish the Palestinians by military means. The Palestinians know that they cannot throw off the occupation by military means.

For the Palestinians, a draw is a huge achievement. The inequality between the two sides is immense. If one takes into account only the strength of arms and the size of forces, without considering the moral factors, the Israeli advantage is astronomical. In such a situation, a draw is a victory for the weak.

We should admit this without hesitation. It is not wise to present the Palestinian side as if it were beaten and broken. Not only because this is untrue, but also because it is dangerous. The boasts of the army propagandists, as if Abu Mazen has folded up under Israeli pressure, are at best stupid, and at worst they are intended to demean and provoke the Palestinians to new violence (or to acts of madness). The Egyptian victory at the beginning of the 1973 war set the scene for Anwar Sadat to make peace with Israel. The Palestinian pride in their steadfastness can make it more acceptable for them to keep the cease-fire.

Now, both sides are exhausted. Palestinian suffering is manifest. Israeli suffering is less obvious, but, nonetheless, real. The costs of the occupation amount to tens of billions, hundreds of thousands of Israelis have sunk beneath the poverty line, the social services are collapsing, foreign investment has not recovered, the level of tourism is pitiful. And, more importantly: during the intifada, 4010 Palestinians and 1050 Israelis have lost their lives.

But a cease-fire is only an interlude, not peace itself. If wisdom prevails in Israel (since it is the stronger side) negotiations for a final settlement will start at once, with the general aim agreed in advance: a Palestinian state in all the territory of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

If wisdom does not prevail (and in politics, the victory of wisdom would be something new), this cease-fire will end up like many before: just an interval between two rounds of fighting.

We are faced with a road sign pointing in two opposite directions: one end directed towards peace, the other towards the next violent confrontation

Source: Amin.org, http://www.amin.org, January 14, 2005.
Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to republish.

I participated in the Palestinian presidential elections very early on Jan. 9. I drove to the village of Anata just outside the municipal borders of Jerusalem, showed them my ID card, got my right hand thumb inked and was given a ballot which I used to cast my vote.

The ink, which some claimed could be easily removed, has stayed on my thumb for a week. Not that it bothered me. Instead, I used it as a badge of honor, showing it off to relatives and friends in Amman and even in Beirut.

I believe that Jan. 9 will be as important for the Palestinians as Sept. 11 was for Americans. It will be remembered as the date which has legally and popularly ushered in a new political era for Palestinians.

The results Mahmoud Abbas accomplished (both in votes received and turnout) confirm his important political role in the post-Arafat era.

Many praised the tenacity and persistence of the many Palestinians insisting on voting despite the occupation and the checkpoints (in spite of the false claims by Israel that it would ease restrictions). While visiting Lebanon this week, I met with Talal Salman, the editor of the left-wing daily As-Safir. I found him, like many other Arabs, to be very impressed with how Palestinians handled themselves during the elections.

Abu Mazen's era will clearly be a challenging one. I was impressed by his statement during the victory speech, in which he said that the small jihad is over and now the greater jihad is upon us. I was waiting to see if Fox TV or William Safire will pounce on Abu Mazen without even knowing what is meant by this statement. In Islam, the smaller jihad is the military jihad against the enemies of God, while the greater jihad (or struggle) is the internal jihad. By running and winning the elections on a platform of non violence and against military acts, Abu Mazen has, in his own eyes, overcome the smaller jihad and has promoted himself to the much more difficult, greater, jihad. It is the difficult soul searching in which you have to struggle with yourself.

I am sure that the greater jihad for Abu Mazen will mean having to decide in favor of the greater interest of the Palestinian people. That decision could come sooner than many people think. Abbas' next steps will be to secure a firm ceasefire agreement, which for the Palestinians will mean a stoppage of attacks against Israelis.

There are at least two things in favor of Abu Mazen's efforts to produce an effective quiet from the Islamists. His strong victory on a high turnout has made it clear that the vast majority of Palestinians support his political platform. It is very important to note that during the election campaign Abbas refused to back down on his demands for an end to the militarization of the Intifada, and refused to apologize for his criticism of the rocket attacks. Noticing the high turnout and the strong mandate that he got, some of the Islamic leaders began publicly casting doubt on the validity of the elections. But a senior Hamas leader, Sheikh Hassan Yousef, rejected these calls by saying on television that Hamas respects the results of the elections and the will of the Palestinian people.

Another item in favor of Abu Mazen is the carrot of the legislative elections. The elections for the next Palestinian parliament, now scheduled for July, is very attractive to the Islamic groups, especially Hamas. They have already encouraged all their supporters to register and did reasonably well in the first leg of the local elections. The result of these elections has whetted their political appetite and they seem poised to participate in full force in the elections this summer.

Many things can happen between now and July, and they are not all within the abilities of the Palestinian leadership. Provocations in the form of further Israeli assassinations or incursions can easily turn a period of quiet on the part of the Palestinians into violence. Splinter groups might also want to mess up any understanding reached between Abu Mazen and the Islamic groups. While these groups might go along with Abbas in talking about a ceasefire, it might take a long time before they officially commit themselves.

A deadline for clear answers will most probably be demanded by Abu Mazen and his aides negotiating with the Islamic groups. The tolerance level will certainly be close to zero after such a date elapses.

If Abu Mazen's efforts at producing a reasonable period of quiet begins to fail, this will be the time that his inner soul will be challenged.

Will he be able to stay neutral if the Islamic and radical militants violate understandings or will he find enough inner strength (the greater jihad) to do what is in the supreme interest of the Palestinian people, even if it means having to be tough with the militants?

Daoud Kuttab is director of the Institute of Modern Media at Al Quds University in Ramallah.

Source: The Washington Post, January 14, 2005, http://www. washingtonpost.com. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to republish.

The election of Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen) in Palestinian voting Sunday came as no surprise. The organized election process, the lively campaign and the openness to the media have all proved once again that if a Palestinian state is established it will be the first Arab democracy. But the state has not yet been established, and the system now headed by Abbas is not much more than a stage set.

The real question is not whether Abbas is genuinely ready for peace and will start combating terrorism tomorrow but whether the United States, Europe and Israel are prepared to seize this rare opportunity: the election as Palestinian leader of a pragmatic person who has taken part in all the peace processes with Israel and who courageously came out against the use of violence in the most recent intifada.

Today Abbas does not need to prove himself. At 69, he is one of the more "transparent" politicians in the region. His books, speeches, interviews and actions are well known. Even during the most difficult moments of the recent election campaign, he went out of his way to condemn the rockets fired against Israel by Hamas, for which he and his policies came under heavy criticism from Islamic elements.

In 1995, after two years of negotiations, we agreed upon what came to be known as the Beilin-Abu Mazen Agreement. This unsigned document was to serve as the basis for the Clinton plan five years later, and to form the basis for negotiations leading up to the Geneva accord, inaugurated a year ago.

On a personal level, Abbas is a pragmatic person, but not necessarily a moderate. He has no sympathy for the Zionist enterprise, but he understood, before many of his colleagues, that the distress of the Palestinian people could be resolved through an independent state next to Israel, rather than in place of it. In principle, his permanent-status agreement is no different from Yasser Arafat's, and at the moment of truth, he may flaunt it, positioning himself as continuing Arafat's legacy. But the real question is not the principles; it is the details. In my opinion, it will be possible to reach a detailed peace agreement with Abbas.

Abbas has won the genuine and extensive support of his people for his new role. Born in Safed and himself a refugee (which means it will be easier for him to persuade refugees to accept the payment due them), he has gained the confidence of President Bush, of the Arab world, of Europe and of many Israeli citizens on both the right and left wings. He opposes violence of any type and has been struggling for a long time to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian permanent-status agreement. His election to head the Palestinian Authority represents a rare opportunity indeed.

But if from this point onward we do nothing more than wait for Abbas to move, it is an opportunity we are likely to miss. Abbas stands at the head of a system that has been destroyed over the past four years. There is no law and order in the Palestinian territories; people are afraid to leave their homes at night. Only part of the security forces obey the head of the Palestinian Authority. Half of Palestinians live under the poverty line, and unemployment is rampant. Abbas may well set up a "government," appear at assemblies, give interviews, try to reach understandings with Hamas and even make visits to other countries. But if he wants to bring about genuine change in conditions, he needs us -- not sitting on the sidelines but out there on the stage, with him.

If President Bush makes do with implementing the "road map" without updating it and setting realistic deadlines, without sending an envoy to the region to supervise and monitor events, without someone on his behalf working day and night to implement the plan that Israel and the Palestinians agreed on (each side according to its own interpretations), then Abbas will fail. Without major political vision, he will not be able to preserve his political existence.

If the Europeans do not provide assistance in financing economic plans, in rehabilitating the infrastructure and in helping the Palestinian security system to train and to function as an effective police force, Mahmoud Abbas will become history even before one of the warlords takes control of the Palestinian Authority. He must prove that he is capable of changing the day-to-day situation and that tranquility is beneficial to the Palestinians.

If Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon proceeds with the withdrawal plan from Gaza as if his partner in peace is Yasser Arafat, if the targeted assassinations continue, if the number of checkpoints is not reduced, if the parties do not return to the negotiating table to discuss the permanent-status agreement after four years during which they have not exchanged a single official word -- then it will be a waste of time to prepare profile reports on Abbas. Then we will have missed this opportunity, too. And we are so very good at missing opportunities.

The writer, a former justice minister of Israel, was initiator of the Oslo peace process. He is the leader of the Yahad Party-SDI (Social Democratic Israel).

Source: The Daily Star, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/, February 3, 2004. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.

Brussels - Are Israelis and Palestinians really ready to strike a peace agreement? Events have certainly moved at a brisk pace in recent months, with one obstacle after another to a lasting deal seeming to fall. Yasser Arafat's death was followed by the choice of his successor in a direct election with universal suffrage, which was accompanied by Israel's decision - one unique in the world - to help, not hinder, the democratic process in territories it occupies. As a result, no one doubts Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' legitimacy.

Moreover, with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's announcement of his intention to withdraw Israel's army unilaterally from Gaza, the occupation itself is once again an open question, offering opportunities for further progress. Indeed, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's support for the Gaza withdrawal has helped open the door to real negotiations.

Such an impressive sequence of events has not been seen for a long time in the Middle East. As a result, many - in and outside the region - are optimistic again. Even Sharon ventures a few favorable comments, and American diplomats express visible sighs of relief that progress toward peace can at last be made.

I can attest to the gathering momentum toward peace, having just returned from Palestine, where I led a nearly five-week mission of European Union observers, the largest ever put in place by the EU. The mission was 260-strong on the day of the election and the counting of the vote, while 40 of us were there for the entire five-week period.

My testimony about the election is categorical: the circumstances were difficult, but the voting was unconstrained and cheating was absent. Given the conditions, the 60 percent voter turnout was astonishing. There can be no doubt that Abbas was democratically elected. Nor is there any doubt that the Palestinian people made a choice for democracy, which entails a choice for a negotiated peace with Israel.

But this leaves out the terrorists, who have not made that choice. They are not numerous, but they are very dangerous. Only genuine progress toward a just peace settlement will neutralize them as a political force.

There is no question that current conditions present a unique window of opportunity. But we must keep in mind the major difficulties that can limit our ability to seize this opportunity, and the international community must make these difficulties very clear to both parties.

The first difficulty is that, although Sharon evidently intends to go through with his military withdrawal from Gaza, he is vague about what he wants to achieve in future negotiations. Indeed, he has never made the slightest allusion to the idea of including the West Bank and Jerusalem in such negotiations. But, for the Palestinians, there can be no negotiations that do not include both issues.

The second difficulty concerns the fact that Sharon has always appeared to believe that it is within the means of the Palestinian Authority to eradicate all terrorism arising from inside the Palestinian territories and aimed at Israel. However, external observers know that this is not the case, even if Abbas can succeed in reducing the level and number of attacks.

In order for the Palestinian people as a whole to cease to glorify, support and shelter terrorists, they need to discover real hope for a new life for themselves. That, in turn, depends on an economic recovery in the Occupied Territories and a belief that concrete steps toward a negotiated political solution are being taken.

The creation of such hope now depends exclusively on Israel, which must act immediately to give a boost to the many Palestinians who yearn for peace rather than continue focusing on a total disappearance of terrorism. Delay on this front will only delay the disappearance of the terrorists.

The third difficulty concerns the fact that, on both sides, most religious authorities, rabbis and imams alike, have maintained a hard-line stance. They continue to preach that the respective "taboos" of their communities, the very issues that block all efforts to make peace - in particular the status of Jerusalem and the "right of return" to Israel for Palestinian refugees - are non-negotiable. To make these religious authorities acknowledge their responsibility is a duty that all of international civil society, including religious leaders, must embrace.

None of these efforts are undoable. All will be demanding. But a chance to achieve real, lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians has clearly arrived. We must seize this moment.

Michel Rocard, a former French prime minister, is a member of the European parliament. This commentary was published in collaboration with Project Syndicate.

Source: The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com, February 12, 2005.
Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to republish.

Gaza - A couple of days after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas declared a halt to hostilities, I met with a few of the many journalists and commentators who roam our streets.

They did not think peace had much of a chance. Hamas had already fired rockets into an Israeli settlement in defiance, and Sharon has long shown he is willing to respond to any provocation with more than equal force. Like all of us here, these journalists had seen many cease-fires and declarations come to nothing. A few of them knew colleagues who had been killed.

The mood was so sour that I -- a children's psychiatrist by profession -- was suddenly struck by the feeling that I was in a counseling session, trying to instill hope in the hearts of traumatized youngsters.

"Do you really trust Hamas to stop terror?" one of the journalists asked me. "Even when they announce that they are not bound by the agreement?"

I have spent many years observing Hamas at close range as it has grown from a small Islamic religious movement into a major army. I have been debating politics with its leaders and members for a long, long time. That experience leads me to believe that Hamas will very soon transform into a political party and will seriously contemplate taking over the government by democratic means.

There are sound reasons for my optimism. The first is that Hamas finally has an incentive to halt terrorist activity. For years, its raison d'etre has been military action. But Hamas has just achieved an astounding victory in municipal elections in the Gaza Strip, winning 70 percent of the seats in local councils. Fatah, the ruling party that had long dominated the political scene, was roundly defeated. Hamas has a guaranteed political future when it chooses to abandon the armed struggle.

Furthermore, close observers have noted important signs of change within Hamas over time. From remarks made by its spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, before his assassination last year, we understand that Hamas is now prepared to accept a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And as the recent elections showed, Hamas now participates fully in the democratic process -- something that it once called a Western conspiracy, and even a sin.

Hamas is becoming more organized, more sophisticated and more confident in itself. For example, in the first intifada, Hamas was quick to charge people with collaboration with Israel and to kill them. That was a sign of insecurity. The Hamas of today pledges not to kill fellow Palestinians, but instead urges the Palestinian Authority to enforce its laws.

This confidence has grown as popular support for Hamas has increased, thanks to its wide network of social programs, its incorruptible image, its adherence to Islamic morals and, most importantly, its record of fighting Israel. It is important to understand that while suicide bombings have made Hamas synonymous with terror to many, Palestinians see these tactics as a way to balance the terror Israel shoves down our throats. Many Palestinians express horror at the atrocities perpetrated by Hamas in the streets of Jerusalem, but go on to say, "The Israelis deserve what they get until they stop killing our children."

In short, Hamas has earned its popular support and it does not want to lose that support, nor its role in the future of Palestine. And that is why I believe it will cooperate with Abu Mazen, as Palestinians respectfully refer to President Abbas. It is precisely because Hamas has such a strong grass-roots base that it recognizes that most Palestinians have learned that violence only inspires retaliation.

The leaders of Hamas have repeatedly declared their respect for Abbas and for the democratic process that elected him. And though there have been violent incidents in the past few days by defiant elements, the organization's leaders quickly backed down when the president denounced the attacks.

Abu Mazen's quick response to the breaching of the cease-fire ^ besides speaking out against Hamas, he sacked top generals and declared a state of emergency -- reflects a man willing to go beyond the vocabulary of peace. He is showing conviction, courage and determination. In contrast to the late Yasser Arafat, he does not see peace as just one tactic, along with violent struggle, for getting Israel to accept a Palestinian state. While Abbas shares the goal of statehood, he believes that only peace can bring it about.

He is also popular in Israel, polls show -- and I see reasons for optimism on that side of the conflict as well. To illustrate, I concluded my remarks to the journalists with a small story:

Not long ago, I was stopped at a Gaza border crossing along with some colleagues. Inside the fortified post was an Israeli soldier, his face appearing every few minutes through a small opening in the concrete. To my surprise he called me over to ask, "Your friend says you are a psychiatrist. Can I ask you something?" "Yes," I replied warily. The soldier said, "I have a problem, doctor. I live in a settlement in Hebron, and I want to leave."

I hid my surprise and played the psychiatrist, listening calmly as this young man with his baby face and thin beard continued: "My parents want me to stay, but I know it will only lead to more killing. I don't like it there, but I don't want to anger my father and mother who have given their lives for me."

After a moment, I said, "I think it is best if you talk about your feelings with your mother and your father. It will be best if you convince them of your decision. But I want to tell you something else, my friend." The soldier smiled in anticipation as I continued: "By choosing to talk to me about yourself, you made me feel proud of humanity and sure of its future." He stretched his arm through the hole to shake my hand, saying, "I trust you."

We trust each other, I told the journalists -- we must, if there is to be any progress. I believe strongly that in the near future, we will be able to include Hamas in that careful, hopeful trust.

Source: Amin.org, http://www.amin.org, February 11, 2005.
Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to publish

Amman - Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Bush administration have correctly pointed that the opportunities for Israeli-Palestinian peace have markedly improved in the past few months. The success that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has had in curbing Palestinian militants seems to have caught both Americans and Israelis by surprise. But what is most important now is how to make sure that this opportunity, like many previous ones, is not missed.

While a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should be the goal for all parties, a more practical approach would be to try and accomplish smaller, more manageable success stories. Success will not happen until the daily lives of Palestinians and Israelis is given top priority.

Israeli citizens must be able to conduct their daily lives in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem with normality and without fear for their lives. While the Israeli population felt a collective sense of terror, Palestinians faced collective punishment in the form of travel restrictions, home demolitions and economic devastation due to various restrictive security arrangements barring the movement of people and goods.

Simultaneous with the improvements in the daily lives of the Palestinians there is need to begin slow but effective negotiations. Every attempt must be made to make sure that the negotiators keep alive hope, the most important ingredient that gives the public something to look forward to. Naturally, this doesn't mean that there should be negotiations for negotiations' sake, but there must be regular and continuous efforts to give Palestinians a feeling that there is positive future ahead of them. Only when they feel that they have more to lose than gain by violence will we be able to cut off the oxygen that has kept the violence alive.

Palestinian-Israeli peace talks at present don't seem to have the ingredients for a quick solution. The differences are so big and the anger is so great that a realistic look at the future of negotiations shows that it will take much longer for results to show than most people would like. If they are going to take a long time, an important part of negotiations will be to agree early on that neither side should carry out actions that will hurt long-term solutions. This means that very early on in the negotiations, both parties must have the courage to be able to agree on the basic shape of the permanent solution. Agreeing on basics early on will become the guiding lamp post for all talks. So, if the two sides agree on the two-state solution - which they seem to have accepted ^ they must agree to do everything possible to ensure that this final status will not be violated by either of them.

Creating facts on the ground and trying to influence the long-term permanent solution can break up the entire process. While this can apply to many aspects, the most obvious issue that threatens the peace talks are the Jewish settlements and Jewish settlement activity.

Most Palestinians insist that one of the main reasons that the Oslo process failed was because it failed to include an iron-clad guarantee that Jewish settlement activities in the Palestinian areas will be suspended. Once Israeli settlements kept growing, the entire peace process faltered because of the lack of trust the Palestinian public had in the talks.

If settlement activity can be stopped, Abbas and the Palestinian negotiators will have plenty of time to work slowly and carefully through the negotiations. For the Palestinians, this particular area is seen as a continuous hemorrhage of the viability of a Palestinian state.

In addition to the settlement issue, much work will be needed on the economic front. The fruits of peace, in the form of an improved economic situation in the future Palestinian state, will also need plenty of attention. This means that on both legal and administrative fronts, as well as the general movement of goods and people, will also need the attention of negotiators.

Palestinians and Israelis have come a long way and the current opportunity should not be lost. Leaders and the public need to work on building on the goodwill that has begun in Sharm El Sheikh. The day-to-day lives of Palestinians and Israelis need to improve and the long-term negotiations must give hope for a safe and secure future for Israel and a free, independent and democratic Palestine.

Daoud Kuttab is a Palestinian media activist. He is the founder of Amman Net Internet radio and is the director of the Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University in Ramallah.

Source: bitterlemons.org, http://www.bitterlemons.org/, February 7, 2005. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to publish.

Tel Aviv - The near euphoric sensation of the past weeks embodies both dangers and opportunities. Euphoria is liable to generate too high a threshold of expectations that will not pass the reality test. On the other hand, this new sensation could restore the hope that has been so absent in the last four years and create a positive psycho-political atmosphere among the relevant publics. And that atmosphere, in turn, will ensure greater survivability for the process and a readiness on the part of the leaders to take more chances than in the past.

Both sides' commitment to embark on a new political path can generate rapid changes and processes on the ground that will accelerate the peace process and assist in returning it to the path it followed prior to the intifada. That is the wish of most of the publics on both sides of the green line. The withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria, an end to terrorism and violence, the reform and democratization process in the Palestinian Authority, and confidence-building measures by Israel, are all good instruments for advancing the peace process. But the question is, what will happen to the process the day after this preliminary arsenal is spent.

The danger confronting us is that the peace process will proceed up to the completion of the withdrawal planned in the context of disengagement, and there it will stop. The surprising disengagement plan was born with the objective of serving a conservative goal: to prevent or at least delay the political process designed to lead to a permanent settlement.

In an optimal situation, logic would dictate that immediately after stabilizing the security situation and following the withdrawal from Gaza and northern Samaria, we enter intensive negotiations over permanent status on the basis of the Geneva Accord. In theory there is no need to beat around the bush. Following the historic precedent of returning to the 1967 borders in the Gaza Strip and removing all the settlements in those areas the IDF leaves, it is only natural to continue the process in the West Bank. The Israeli and Palestinian publics know almost precisely what final status will look like; hence, logically, we should implement it.

But political realities are not necessarily logical. The man heading Israel's government today is not a leader capable of making the leap to a real and fair permanent settlement, but rather one who has not yet internalized the fact that there is no other option. Yet the historical imperative appears to be stronger than the leader and his party.

Accordingly, in order to generate and strengthen the right dynamic that will move the process and oblige the Israeli side to enter serious negotiations on permanent status as early as possible, we have to reexamine the existing tools in our long-term arsenal. Regrettable as this may sound, the only relevant tool to be found is the Quartet's roadmap. Hence we must return to implementation of this plan, with the goal of exploiting it as a means of moving us in an agreed and organized manner out of the twilight and into a period of renewed peace negotiations.

Paradoxically, we are talking here of a limited plan, a fairly sloppy patchwork document that was outdated the moment it was published, and even then would not have stood the test of reality. But it is the only document that is agreed, at least at the level of principle, by both sides. Further, this is the program to which the American president is committed, and it is he who must become involved in pushing the Israeli side to join the "permanent status tango".

The day after withdrawal from Gaza, progress is the name of the game. The Palestinians cannot allow themselves to march in place, just as they cannot enter negotiations over an interim agreement without knowing precisely how final status will look. An updated version of the roadmap in which, for example, phase II--which is liable to be a deathtrap for a real process~is replaced by deep withdrawals in the West Bank along the lines of the Oslo "further redeployments" and the parameters of phase III are spelled out in greater detail, could constitute a possible solution in the absence of an alternative mechanism.

The roadmap is today the only game in town. In the current effort to restart the process even a mediocre and incomplete plan is a legitimate tool for relaunching the long road to peace.

Dr. Ron Pundak is the director general of the Peres Center for Peace. Since 1992, he has been intensively involved in track II activities, including those that produced the Oslo track.

Jerusalem - Too much of what has happened in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship since the election of Mahmoud Abbas is reminiscent of the failed Oslo process. The same euphoria has appeared ^ just look at the Tel Aviv and the Palestinian stock markets. The same voices of self-assurance and self-reliance that "we can do it by ourselves" are heard.

There are many lessons to be learned from the Oslo process that have not been learned. One of the clearest is that we cannot do it by ourselves. There is absolutely no basis to trust each other. All of the confidence-building measures in the world will not overcome four years of mutual blood-letting.

Both sides breached the Oslo Agreements, almost from the very beginning, and there was no mechanism to resolve emerging disputes. The Oslo Agreements contained dispute-resolution clauses, but they were rarely, if ever, implemented.

These called for negotiating disputes; if unresolved the parties were to go to mediation, but they never defined "mediation," or selected a mediator. After trying mediation they should have gone to arbitration ^ but they never defined the rules for arbitration, or agreed upon an arbitrator.

So disputes remained on the table. Breaches of Oslo became more significant than what was implemented. With so much ambiguity and no one to judge or to facilitate negotiations, mediation or arbitration, what became of the agreements was what we have experienced over the past four and a quarter years.

The most vital element of a renewed political process is security. Everything is linked to security. The release of prisoners, freedom of movement for people and goods, economic development, the legitimacy of both Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and PA President Mahmoud Abbas ^ all are inextricably linked to the question of security.

The success of any new security regime is perhaps foremost dependent on the political will of the Palestinian leadership rather than on their ability. But almost equally important is the security coordination that will develop on the ground between the Palestinian Authority and Israeli security apparatuses.

Renewed security coordination began on Palestinian election day. Israeli and Palestinian officers returned to the same room in Beit El where they had sat together on a daily basis until September 2000. The reports of successful coordination only reinforced the sense that they could pick up the pieces from where they fell more than four years ago.

But, predictably, with the very first crisis after a 10-year-old Palestinian girl was killed by Israeli or Palestinian fire ^ it is still not clear ^ and after Palestinian police deployed in Gaza, and rockets continued to fly, mutual accusations and acrimonious tones flew with greater velocity than the rockets.

Israeli-Palestinian bilateral security coordination is a recipe for failure. Even during the best days of Oslo the bilateral security coordination would receive barely a passing grade. The coordination and cooperation in the field of intelligence was more successful, primarily because of the relatively high level of trust that existed between the Shin Bet and the Palestinian intelligence forces.

But today, there is no way direct Israeli-Palestinian intelligence coordination and cooperation can work.

Israel will not pass intelligence information directly to the Palestinians for fear of "burning" sources. Palestinian security forces will never meet Israeli expectations.

We hear that Israel does not expect 100% results, but it does expect 100% effort. What are the criteria and who will be the judge? What should occur if and when terrorists succeed in killing Israelis? What mechanism can prevent an escalation of violence?

There are no magic answers, but there are some preemptive steps that could help: There is an urgent need for a third-party coordination mechanism on the ground to assist, facilitate, manage and, if need be, enforce a regime of security coordination.

A coalition of third parties led by the US, including Egypt, Britain and Jordan, should establish joint operation rooms in Gaza and the West Bank with sufficient capacities to assess, on a daily basis, field-level incidents. The joint operation rooms, with Israeli and Palestinian liaison officers on site, would assist in coordinating security relations, mediating disputes and ensuring that any security event is assessed and treated directly and effectively, preventing any chance of escalation.

This would not be a peacekeeping force of hundreds or thousands but a small and efficient team of security experts, led by the U.S. They would be committed and mandated to ensure that security understandings are met and that the spoilers do not have the power to prevent what the large majority of Israelis and Palestinians want ^ movement back on the road map to peace.

Gershon Baskin is the Israeli co-director of the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information. www.ipcri.org.

Source: Forward, at http://www.forward.com/, December 24, 2004.
Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to republish

It used to be that Israel was the one seeking peace and Syria the one turning it down. Of late, however, it has been Damascus extending the olive branch - and making a whole lot of people scratch their heads. Is Syria serious about wanting to resume peace talks? Should Israel shun Damascus's invitation, or should it explore, if not exploit, this opportunity?

Israeli leaders are arguing that Syria is using the resumption of talks as a ploy to dilute Washington's mounting pressure on Damascus. Syrian officials, meanwhile, say they are reaching out to Israel in large part because the United States seems to have forfeited its role of honest broker in the region in general, and toward Syria in particular. Washington's pressure on Prime Minister Sharon to reject Syrian overtures - out of State Department fears that Syrian-Israeli talks will sidetrack Israel's planned withdrawal from Gaza and Defense Department insistence that Syria be held accountable for its role in Iraq - is one case in point.

Whatever Syria's motivation in wanting to resume unconditional bilateral talks with Israel, the bottom line is that Damascus's offer represents a unique opportunity to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.

That Syria seeks a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should not be seen as the product of any love Syrians have for Israel - they have none. Rather, Damascus wants peace with Israel for the simple reason that peace is in Syria's national interest. Syria's goal has been and continues to be the containment of Israel within its 1967 boundaries. Given Israel's superior military - and few people in Syria harbor any doubts that Israel is militarily superior to any combination of Arab power - Syria has come to acknowledge that its goal cannot be achieved by force. This no-nonsense assessment has been the cornerstone of Syria's Israel policy since the collapse of its superpower patron, the Soviet Union, and it is on this premise that the late president Hafez Assad engaged Israel in bilateral peace talks until his passing in 2000.

But even though this sober assessment might provide Israel with more of a security guarantee than Israel's doctrine of military superiority, Sharon continues to oppose the resumption of peace talks with Syria, and this despite the advice of his top brass. From a strict balance of power standpoint, Sharon is right: Israel is now so powerful that it need not resume talks, let alone withdraw from the Golan Heights. Furthermore, Syria has scrupulously adhered to the status quo for the past 30 years, and nothing suggests that it will do things differently now. Syria is now weak, and therefore not a threat to Israel. Under these circumstances, why should Israel give Syria anything?

The balance of power should rightly be the major consideration in the strategic calculi of Israeli decision-makers. It should not, however, be the only one.

With Syria calling for peace, it makes sense for Israel to seize the opportunity not out of Israeli affection for Syria - there is none ^ but rather to accomplish what Israel has sought throughout its embattled history: to be accepted in the region and to live within secure and recognized boundaries, free from the threat of war. Indeed, peace with Syria removes a major part of that threat. It is worth remembering that during the Syrian-Israeli peace talks in January 2000, Damascus accepted the principle of normalization of relations, including the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states and the free flow of people and goods and services across the border; a mutual security regime; and the establishment of a joint water-sharing mechanism, which has critical geopolitical implications. Over and above that, peace with Syria opens the door to the normalization of relations between Israel and all other Arab countries.

Moreover, despite its current weakness, Syria still holds many important cards. Peace with Syria weakens Hezbollah and Hamas. Peace with Syria neutralizes Iran. Peace with Syria also means that Damascus could, for a price, be helpful in solving the thorny issue of Palestinian refugees. If Israel plays its cards right and accepts the land-for-peace equation, Syria might be willing to absorb the roughly half-million Palestinian refugees residing in Syria.

Syria might also be able to aid Israel in reaching a more favourable agreement on the absorption of the roughly quarter-million Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. While it would be difficult for Damascus to persuade Beirut to resettle all its Palestinian refugees, Syria wields substantial clout in Lebanon. Such influence, however, might not last for long, to judge by the growing pressure from Washington on Syria to withdraw its troops.

If Syrian and Israeli leaders seize the opportunity, there is now a chance for both peoples to live and let live. The current convergence of interests could well mean that the two long-time belligerents need not be locked in a warring relationship forever.

Murhaf Jouejati, an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and a visiting professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, was an adviser to the Syrian delegation during peace talks with Israel between 1991 and 1996.

Source: The Daily Star, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/, January 17, 2005.
Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission to republish.

For the first time in months, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his chief political rival, Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have found something they can agree on: the selection of a new governor of the Bank of Israel.

Stanley Fischer, formerly the vice chairman of Citigroup, agreed to move to Israel and begin a five-year term as governor. Fischer, an American citizen, is a well-known economist with extensive experience in both the public and private sectors.

In the course of his career he headed the Economics department at MIT, served as the chief economist at the World Bank, and after seven years as the first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, accepted the position at Citigroup. Fischer has a strong history of involvement in Israel's economic development. In the mid-1980s, as Israel battled crippling inflation, Fischer (operating under U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz) worked effectively with then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres to reform important sectors of Israel's economy and bring inflation under control. In the early 1990s, he facilitated a dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian economists to create strategies for regional economic development parallel to the political process started by the Oslo Accords.

In an interview with Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronoth in 2003, Fischer unambiguously argued that "Israel's economy will not recover from its [intifada-induced] slump without a resumption of the peace process with the Palestinians." In other words, with the prospect of continuing violence and the absence of hope for the future, Israel's economy will continue to suffer. This conclusion is hard to refute. One can see it in an assessment of economic indicators since the year 2000, when observers were hopeful about the peace process. Since the violence began, Israel, in Fischer's opinion, has fallen out of favor with the financial world, including Europe, Israel's chief trading partner.

Foreign investment, including investment in the hi-tech sector, a major component of Israel's economic boom of the 1990s, has slowed considerably since the intifada started in September of 2000, and Israel, facing a recession, was forced to cut its interest rates. The NIS has lost significant ground against the euro, the drop in the rate of growth - in 2000 Israel's economic growth rate was 8 percent and the economy shrank by almost 1 percent in 2002, and the rate of growth was only 1.3 percent in 2003 - has been precipitous, personal savings rates are down by almost 50 percent, and Israel's large budget deficit drives the government even deeper into debt. Israel's billion-dollar tourist industry has only begun to recover from the blow it received from the eruption of violence in 2001, and in 2004 Israel's hotels were still half empty.

Because the economy has not grown as fast as it might have under peaceful conditions, nearly 20 percent of the population, including hundreds of thousands of children, live below the official poverty line. This is exacerbated by cuts to social welfare programs as Israel trims its budget and moves toward a market economy. The unemployment rate stands at over 10 percent. Certainly the decline of the hi-tech industry in 2000 and the global downturn in economic activity following the Sept. 11, 2001 , attacks on the U.S. contributed to Israel's economic malaise. But the persistence of the recession, in comparison with the dynamic economy of the 1990s, is a product of the hopelessness brought about by the collapse of the peace process in 2000 and the ensuing violence.

Fischer hopes to stabilize the economy through neo-liberal policy, market reforms, and a lower interest rate, but realizes that he cannot pull off an economic miracle without a political breakthrough with the Palestinians. Although a negotiated final settlement with the Palestinians would do much to improve Israel's economy, that day is a long way off, even under the best of circumstances. But hope in the political process, a precondition for investment and growth, can be instilled in the short term now that there is a new, more moderate Palestinian leadership. The election of Mahmoud Abbas, together with the upcoming Israeli evacuation of settlements and troops from the Gaza Strip and a small part of the West Bank, could present an opportunity for Palestinians and Israelis to work together productively to the benefit of their respective economies.

The economic benefit of this potential cooperation may already be surfacing. Israel has seen some improvements in 2004, but these modest advances were directly linked to political initiatives and opportunities, like the announcement of the disengagement plan and Arafat's death. It is somewhat ironic that Sharon and Netanyahu would look to an American supporter of the peace process to reinvigorate Israel's economy. Most analysts speculate that they selected Fischer because of his stature, governmental and business connections, and his sympathetic view of Netanyahu's reforms, but the decision could end up affecting more than just the country's finances. Fischer's appointment has already stimulated debate in Israel on the character of Israeli-diaspora relations and the controversial neoliberal direction in which Netanyahu has steered Israel's economy. But his appointment also highlights the link between political progress with the Palestinians and economic prosperity for Israel, and it is here that Fischer's influence may well have the greatest impact on Israel's future.